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Abstract
The theory of the monetary circuit aims to provide a highly stylised account of the workings of 
a modern monetary production economy. While there may have been a time when it 
succeeded in this aim, that time is over. The key development in the monetary sphere of 
capitalism over recent decades is the advent of financialisation, a phenomenon that circuit 
theory cannot explain other than by omitting some of its most important characterising 
features while indiscriminately dismissing those features that it does address as dysfunctional 
outgrowths. The fact is that a theory that has the aggregate monetary circuit as its 
methodological framework and whose sole focus is on the financing needs of firms is simply 
not flexible enough to accommodate the new reality of financialisation. To make that 
accommodation what is needed is a framework that is sufficiently elastic as to be able to 
encompass a broad range of socio-economic factors, most notably those associated with 
demographic change, as co-drivers of financialisaton. This article argues that a framework 
based on Marx’s commodity principle meets this requirement.
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Introduction
It can happen that the congruence between an economic theory and economic reality at one 
point in capitalism’s history abruptly gives way to incongruence at a later point in that history 
following the emergence of new phenomena. Two interpretations of such an occurrence are 
possible. The first is to lay the blame at the door of the phenomena in that they can be said to 
represent dysfunctional and thus transient aspects of capitalism’s development. The second 
interpretation is to lay the blame at the door of the theory in that it can be said to have been 
rendered obsolete by the new phenomena. What is not possible is to advance both 
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interpretations simultaneously, that is, to maintain that the economic theory in question 
continues to be valid even while acknowledging that the new phenomena are entirely in 
keeping with capitalism’s underlying logic. It is the central thesis of this article that just such a 
conundrum characterises the relation between the theory of the monetary circuit on the one 
hand and the reality of financialisation on the other.
Simply put, the financialisation of today’s capitalist economy signifies the growth of 
financial securities relative to the underlying productive sector. When the reality was that the 
securities markets were comparatively small, circuit theory had little difficulty in 
accommodating that reality in its idealisation of the triangular relations linking banks, firms 
and households: the securities markets simply constituted an auxiliary space where firms sold 
shares to recoup the money from households not spent on consumption, thus enabling the 
former to repay their debt to banks. 
By contrast, circuit theory does have difficulty in accommodating the new reality of 
financialisation. This is because the growth in the scale of securities markets cannot be 
reconciled with firms’ production motive, which in the theory is that which sets in motion the 
whole monetary circuit process because of firms’ need to finance investments and pay wages 
through bank borrowing. To get around the problem of excessive financial scale, circuit 
theorists have tried two tactics: one is to confront the problem head on, but dismiss it as a 
dysfunctional outgrowth of contemporary capitalism; the other is to incorporate into the theory 
certain new features of the securities markets while leaving out the most important new 
feature of all, namely, that of scale. Neither tactic works. If one is to explain financialisation, 
one has to explain why the world’s securities markets have grown to a size where they now 
completely dominate the world’s material output base on which they rest. At the same time, 
given that the majority of financial securities are held by organisations that are not ordinarily 
identified with potentially dysfunctional activities such as short-term speculation, it follows 
that one has to explain how the huge scale of the securities markets is necessary to the 
functioning of capitalism in its current stage of development. In short, to explain 
financialisation one has to explain the functionality of financial scale. Such an explanation 
requires an analytical apparatus whose scope and reach is sufficiently elastic as to extend 
beyond a narrow focus on the financing needs of production. This article will argue that Marx’s 
commodity principle fits this requirement.
The article is structured as follows. Section one provides a brief outline of circuit theory 
and of its first approach to financialisation: i.e., financial scale as dysfunctional. Section two 
briefly discusses circuit theorists’ second approach to financialisation: i.e., financial scale 
ignored. Section three provides data indicating the importance of demographic change to the 
financialisation process. Section four provides an account of financialisation based on the 
extension of Marx’s commodity principle to financial securities, and section five concludes.
Circuit theory: First approach to financialisation
The theory of the monetary circuit as developed by heterodox economists drawn principally 
from Italy and France aims to provide a highly stylised account of the workings of a modern 
production economy.1 The theory eschews any form of methodological reductionism in favour 
of an aggregative approach that focuses on the triangular relations linking together three 
major sectors of the economy: banks, firms, and households. Given the essentiality of money 
to the modern economy and given that banks are the dominant suppliers of money, one can 
see why circuit theorists assign primacy to the bank-based credit relation in the triangular 
relational chain. Circuit theory has a distinctive take on a number of other subject areas 
3Lysandrou
including those of income distribution, employment determination, economic stability, and 
monetary policy. However, its highly aggregative approach to the study of the economic system 
and its prioritisation of the credit relation in particular are the only characterising features of 
the theory that really matter for the present investigation into how it approaches the subject of 
financialisation. The fundamental question in this regard is this: does circuit theory provide as 
robust an account of today’s ‘financialised’ capitalism as it did of yesterday’s ‘industrialised’ 
capitalism? To answer this question, we look at a first way in which circuit theorists adapted 
their theory to explain financialisation, taking as our example a 2013 article by Mario 
Seccareccia.2
Figure 1 reproduces Seccareccia’s illustration of the canonical model of the monetary 
circuit in the pre-financialisation era. The key links in the circuit are as follows: (1) the ‘initial 
finance’ or ‘efflux’ stage of the circuit is set in motion when banks lend money to firms [M] for 
the purpose of paying wages [Y] to households (the payment of wages to bank workers [Yb] 
plus interest on deposits [iM] also constitute part of the efflux stage); (2) households allocate 
income between consumption [(1–s)]Y] and savings [S], with [s] being the average propensity 
to save; and (3), while household consumption expenditure allows firms to repay bank loans, 
the ‘final finance’ or ‘reflux’ stage of the circuit will only be closed if firms can divert household 
savings away from bank deposits and into the securities [B] issued by the former. 
Figure 1. Traditional role of banks in the pre-financialisation era. Source: Seccareccia (2013).
Although one can disagree with this interpretation of the role of the securities markets in the 
pre-financialisation era, one cannot deny that it may have some plausibility: these markets are 
presented as small and peripheral because their primary purpose is not to raise funds for 
production, which is the province of the firm-bank nexus, but to recoup the money spent on 
wages, while the passivity of these markets is put down to the fact that the main buyers of 
securities are households who have a vested interest in firms’ long term investment plans. 
What has far less plausibility is the interpretation of the role of the securities markets in the 
financialisation era. 
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Figure 2 below reproduces Seccareccia’s illustration of the monetary circuit in the new 
era. The financial markets are now depicted as having the central dominant position in the 
circuit, first because firms, faced with growing profits and declining investment opportunities, 
are directing substantial proportions of these profits into share buy-backs and purchases of 
other securities, and, second, because the banks, eager to exploit the opportunities for 
boosting their own profits, are feeding firms’ demand for securities through sales of 
securitised household mortgage and other credit loans and through sales of derivatives. 
Figure 2. Strategic role of banks during the financialisation era. Source: Seccareccia (2013).
The monetary circuit under financialisation still involves the same three sectors, firms, 
banks, and households, and it still essentially consists of a chain of counterparty relations. 
The difference is that both the content of this relational chain and its underlying motivational 
force are now the exact opposite of what they once were: firms are now net lenders rather than 
net borrowers; households are now net borrowers rather than net lenders, and banks, while 
still occupying a central, strategic role, do so less as lenders of money to firms to finance their 
production than as sellers of derivatives and other financial products to accommodate firms’ 
speculative excesses. As Seccareccia (2013: 186) puts it, summing up what he perceives to 
be the essence of financialisation: 
Owing to the corporate sector’s position as net lender, rentier speculative behaviour (that Keynes had so 
vehemently criticised in The General Theory) has slowly prevailed in the financial sector and has probably 
been the largest impetus in pushing this financialisation frenzy into hyper drive over the last decade. It is, 
therefore, in large part due to the growing proportion of corporate saving that has been directed towards 
speculative ventures in a way that household and even, say, group pension funds would be less likely to do, 
because of legal restrictions imposed on portfolio managers regarding the risk structure of their portfolio of 
pension assets.
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This characterisation of financialisation and of its driving forces is inaccurate. The reason is 
not that the particular facts produced in support of this characterisation are questionable so 
much as that other important facts concerning both the supply and demand sides of the 
financial securities markets have been omitted. Most notable amongst the omissions on the 
supply side are the following: First, while it is true that there has been a sharp rise in share 
buy-backs over the past two decades, the corporate sector taken as a whole continues to be a 
net borrower of funds as attested by the continuing growth of the corporate bond markets. 
Second, while the volume of asset-backed securities created by the banking sector has grown 
in recent years, this still remains small when compared with the volumes of outstanding 
financial bonds, that is, bonds issued by commercial banks for reasons to be explained below. 
Third, and this is the most conspicuous omission, there is no reference to the growing 
importance of governments as suppliers of bonds. Turning to the demand side, firms are  not 
among the most important buyers of equity and debt securities. Rather, the top group of 
security buyers are the institutional asset managers: the pension and mutual funds, and the 
insurance companies. 
The upshot of these observations is that while Seccareccia is correct in saying that the 
current scale of these markets is excessive when viewed from the standpoint of the production 
needs of firms, he is incorrect in fully attributing the excess in scale to “rentier speculative 
behaviour” (2013: 186). This is not to say that there is no such behaviour in the securities and 
other financial markets. Hedge funds and other speculative vehicles, funded in large part by 
the world’s super rich individuals, do indeed play a highly active, and often highly destabilising, 
role in the financial markets. Rather, it is to say that speculative behaviour cannot be the 
overall characterising feature of the current scale of financial market activity because much of 
that activity is conducted by organisations that are neither rentiers nor speculators.
Circuit theory: Second approach to financialisation
We now turn to circuit theorists’ alternative approach to circumventing the problem of the 
functionality of financial scale, which is to accept the functionality of financialisation but 
ignore the issue of scale. A good example of this can be found in Malcolm Sawyer’s 2016 
article, “Grazianis’ analysis of the circuit: Does it extend to the era of financialisation?” Sawyer 
has other articles that attempt to accommodate financialisation within the circuit theory 
framework (Passarella and Sawyer, 2014; Sawyer and Passarella, 2015), but it is this 2016 
article that, as signalled by its title, puts the question of viability in its most direct form.
According to Sawyer (2016: 303), the article “presents a development of a circuit analysis 
in which some features of financialisation are incorporated”. Before incorporating these 
features, he summarises the central aim of circuit theory and the reason behind its distinctive 
logical framework. The aim is to investigate the financial requirements for production to occur. 
As Sawyer (2016: 306) states: “The circuitist approach is indeed a theory of monetary 
production: it focuses on the financing requirements for production to occur, for firms to 
acquire materials and labour”. The reason for developing a framework in which firms are 
linked together with banks and households in a circular chain of relations is that both of the 
latter sectors are key to the financing of production: banks in that they are the providers of 
‘initial finance’, i.e., of bank loans to firms that enable production to be undertaken, and 
households in that they are instrumental to the ‘final finance’ phase of the circuit, i.e., firms 
need to collect liquidity from the sale of commodities or securities to households in order to 
repay their debt to banks. 
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When approaching the question as to whether circuit theory can extend to 
financialisation, Sawyer (2016: 304) insists “that the central feature of the circuitist analysis 
based on the distinction between initial finance and final finance remains in place” and all 
that is needed are certain amendments “which relate to the direction of flow of funds between 
the three sectors (banks, firms and households” and which involve bringing into the analysis 
“investment banks, savings banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs, now often put 
under the label of ‘shadow banks’)”.3 Figure 3 below illustrates circuit analysis as amended to 
extend to financialisation. As shown in the figure, the amendments to circuit theory relate 
primarily to the final finance phase of the monetary circuit. Commercial banks are still the key 
providers of initial finance, but where previously in the simple circuit firms would sell securities 
directly to households to collect the liquidity needed to discharge their debts, in the modified 
and more complex circuit firms sell securities to two sets of financial intermediaries, savings 
and investment banks on the one hand and NBFIs on the other, who in turn collect savings 
from households through the sale of their various investment services.
Figure 3. A more complex circuit. Source: Sawyer (2016).
On the surface there would appear to be nothing wrong with the incorporation of savings 
and investment banks and NBFIs inside the monetary circuit, thus creating a more complex 
circuit. These latter institutions are, after all, financial intermediaries that exist to facilitate, as 
Sawyer (2016: 312) states: “two related roles: one is the matching of savings with the volume 
of new financial assets (which would include new equity, savings, deposits), and the other, at 
the micro level, is the matching of the demand to hold different financial assets with the 
willingness of the financial sector and firms to issue different financial assets”. That the 
incorporation of these financial institutions inside the circuit is essentially wrong, however, 
becomes evident the moment one seriously addresses the current scale of the financial 
securities markets. 
Sawyer (2016: 312) briefly refers to the “volume of new financial assets”, but that is all 
that it is: a brief reference. Earlier in the article, he draws attention to the fact that the 
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financial assets now held by UK households is large compared to UK GDP, after which he then 
states: “This level of assets and liabilities (and their general growth) is another reflection of a 
general tendency for financial assets and financial liabilities to grow faster than GDP and the 
capital stock” (Sawyer, 2016: 310). The statement that there is “a general tendency for 
financial assets and financial liabilities to grow faster than GDP” is correct but, once again, 
that is all that it is: a statement. There is no elaboration, no explanation as to the reasons why 
financial securities volumes are growing faster than GDP and no explanation of the 
composition of these growing volumes of financial securities. These aspects of financial scale 
are omitted from discussion because they simply cannot be reconciled with the financing 
needs of production, which, as Sawyer reminds us, is the central focus of attention in circuitist 
analysis. The securities issued by corporations are certainly related, one way or another, to the 
financing of production. However, this is not the case as regards the securities issued by 
governments and a significant proportion of the securities issued by banks. The recent sharp 
growth of these particular segments of the global securities markets have more connection 
with the exigencies of demographic change than with the funding needs of corporations, as 
will now be explained.
The importance of demographic change as a driver of financialisation
Financialisation signifies the growing size of the financial sector relative to the real sector but, 
having said this, not all financial sub-sectors have grown at the same rate. 
Table 1. Growth of world deposits and world GDP. Source: Kaltenbrunner and Lysandrou (2017).
Figure 4. Growth of world securities markets. Source: Kaltenbrunner and Lysandrou (2017).
The global amounts of bank deposit money on the one side and of global equity stocks on the 
other have grown more or less in line with the growth of world GDP. By contrast, global bond 
volumes have grown at an appreciably higher rate so that where the aggregate value of these 
volumes amounted to less than half of that of world GDP in 1980, they came to match world 
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GDP by 2000 and now average about one and a quarter times the size of world GDP (thus in 
2018, global bonds outstanding amounted to about $103 trillion as compared with world GDP 
of $86 trillion for that year [SIFMA, 2019]). Although this bond market growth has been a 
worldwide development, the overwhelming proportion of outstanding bond volumes continue 
to be accounted for by the US and other advanced market economies (AMEs). Thus in 2018 
these economies accounted for 85% of the world total of $103 trillion, the US on its own 
accounting for 40%, while all of the emerging market economies (EMEs) accounted for the 
remaining 15%. It is this heavily skewed geographical breakdown of global bond volumes, 
coupled with the fact that it is the AME governments and banks that continue to be the leading 
suppliers of bonds, which indicates the importance of a broad range of socio-economic related 
factors, most notably those associated with demographic change, as contributory drivers of 
financialisation.
As regards demography, what sets the AMEs apart is their low and in some cases even 
negative rate of population growth (which contrasts with the high rate of population growth 
registered in most of the world’s EMEs) combined with a high rate of population ageing. Thus, 
for example, the median age of the population in North America and Western Europe rose from 
32 in 1980 to 41 in 2010, while the median age in Africa over that same period only rose from 
18 to 20 (UN DESA 2019). This combination has inevitably led to a trend rise in old-age 
dependency ratios across the AMEs (defined as the number of individuals aged over 65 per 
100 individuals aged between 20 and 64). Thus, according to recent OECD estimates the 
dependency ratio across all OECD countries roughly doubled from 13.9 in 1950 to 27.9 by 
2015 and is expected to reach 35.2 by 2025.4 Closely correlated with population ageing and 
the rise in old-age dependency ratios over recent decades has been the rise in government 
social spending as a percentage of GDP (from an average percentage share of just 8% in 
1960, that share had risen to an average of 17% across the OECD countries by 1990 and to 
an average of 20% in 2018),5 and as a percentage share of total government expenditure (the 
average share for the EU-28 countries in 2018 was 40%, but closer to 50% for the UK and 
other Northern European countries, a figure similar to that for the US) with pensions and 
health care provision being the two largest components of government social spending (Ortiz-
Ospina and Roser, 2016; OECD, 2019a; Kenworthy, 2019).
Faced with rising pension and healthcare costs in addition to other spending 
commitments, while at the same constrained from increasing tax revenues at a 
commensurable rate due to the falling percentage numbers of working taxpayers, AME 
governments have had to increase their rate of bond issuance to make good their budgetary 
gaps. Government dependence on the bond markets is not new, but where prior to 1980 
governments would typically issue small amounts of securities or, if issuing large amounts 
would only do so as a temporary measure to confront a particular emergency or to fund a 
particular project, their dependence on the bond markets has since then become both 
significant and permanent, with the need to cope with the exigencies of demographic change 
being a key factor in this development. The AME commercial banking sector has faced a 
similar predicament. Commercial banks have traditionally relied primarily on household 
deposits to fund their loans to businesses and households, but the fact that households, who 
are living longer after retirement, are increasingly shifting their retirement savings out of bank 
deposits and into financial market investments in the search for yield means that banks have 
had to considerably increase their issuance of long term bonds and short term money market 
instruments to fill the gaps in the liability side of their balance sheets.
This sharp growth in the rate of government and bank bond issuance has required 
investors with a large enough absorption capacity on the demand side of the bond markets. 
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There are now several types of such large investors including central banks, sovereign wealth 
funds, and high net worth individuals, but the biggest group when taken collectively are the 
institutional asset managers, the pension and mutual funds and the insurance companies. 
Once a small cottage industry catering for the wealthy, institutional asset management has 
become in many countries a mass industry catering for the welfare needs of large sections of 
the population. With this growth in scale has come a corresponding growth in the need for 
investable assets, value containers into which clients’ monies can be poured and from which 
monies can be extracted to pay clients. Although there are many other types of assets that 
serve as investables, including real estate, gold, and other natural commodities, financial 
securities necessarily comprise the majority proportion of institutional asset holdings because 
what sets them apart from other asset classes is their ability to combine a value storage 
property with the properties of liquidity (i.e., they can be converted into cash with minimal 
impact on price) and tradability (i.e., they can be circulated without restriction amongst 
investors). These latter two properties are important to institutional asset managers because 
they all need to frequently engage in rebalancing trades to keep portfolios to a specified 
investment rule or target while at the same accepting fresh cash inflows from clients or 
disbursing cash to clients. In addition to liquidity and tradability, the finite maturity of bonds is 
another property that makes them particularly attractive to insurance companies and pension 
funds, who have fairly predictable amounts of liabilities periodically falling due and who thus 
need assets containing equivalent amounts of value to match those liabilities.
Despite the fact that institutional asset management is now undergoing rapid growth in 
all regions of the world, the bulk of assets under management continues to be concentrated in 
the US and Western Europe.6 The transformation of asset management into a mass industry 
first occurred in these countries in the 1970s and 1980s, the major catalyst behind this 
transformation being the governmental shift away from universal forms of welfare provision 
towards more selective forms that concentrate provision on the poorest and most vulnerable 
sections of the population. It is because increasing numbers of middle-income households in 
these countries are now forced to make their own pension and healthcare arrangements, in 
addition to any expectations that they may have of a longer post-retirement life, that explains 
why they are moving their savings funds out of bank deposits and into securities in the search 
for higher yield, while the fact that most of these households remain risk averse explains why 
savings are typically channelled into securities via professional asset managers. Having helped 
to create a large body of demand for bonds in addition to other securities, AME governments 
have been more than ready to tap into this demand. The tightening of monetary policy from 
about 1980 onwards ties in with this development because if inflation targeting is the major 
aim of this monetary tightening, a major reason for containing inflation is to help contain the 
interest costs on rising government borrowing volumes. 
In helping to boost the asset management industry, AME governments have helped to 
create a strong and stable demand not only for their own bonds and for those of the 
commercial banks but also for the bonds issued by the non-bank corporate sector. Although 
this sector continues to account for a smaller percentage share of global bond supplies as 
compared with those of the government and banking sectors, the overall size of the non-bank 
corporate bond market has nevertheless increased significantly in recent decades. In an era of 
rapid technological change and thus ever intensifying competition, business corporations must 
have constant access to large external sources of funds to finance research and product 
development, or to finance mergers and acquisitions, or to finance any of the other measures 
needed to ensure their survival. Corporations have always tended to rely on a mix of debt and 
equity forms of external finance to supplement their funding needs, in order to avoid an 
10 Finance and Society 6(1) 
excessive concentration of risk on the one hand and an excessive dilution of the benefits of 
ownership and control on the other. What is now happening is that while the ratio of debt to 
equity forms of external funds raised by corporations remains fairly stable, the ratio of bank 
borrowing to security market forms of funding is declining. The fact that bonds are tradable in 
a way that bank loans are not, and thus the fact that institutional investors do not need to be 
compensated for loss of liquidity in the way that banks must be when they extend loans, 
means that large corporations are increasingly relying on the bond markets for all but very 
short period borrowing requirements. 
To summarise, the observed volume growth of the world’s securities markets since 1980, 
coupled with the distinctive geographical and sectoral breakdown of this volume growth, gives 
strong indication that broad socio-economic related factors, most notably those associated 
with demographic change, are as important a driving force of financial scale as are the 
narrower firm-related factors. Strip out the socio-economic related factors and the large size of 
the global securities markets in excess of corporate production needs becomes something 
that is difficult to explain. Only when the non-firm related factors are incorporated into an 
explanation of security market size can that explanation allow for the functionality of financial 
scale. However, this interpretation of the empirical data raises the question as to how it can be 
reconciled with capitalism’s logic as a generically distinct economic system in which 
production is geared to the market rather than to self-subsistence, and in which market 
supplies and demands are matched through decentralised monetary exchanges rather than 
through a central price setting authority. In raising the bank-firm credit relation to the status of 
a third generic feature of capitalism, circuit theorists may not be able to give a satisfactory 
explanation of financialisation, but they are at least right in attempting to locate this 
explanation in an economic theory of capitalism. In our view, one such theory that can be 
adapted to the present to accommodate both the socio-economic and firm-related drivers of 
financialisation is Marx’s theory of capitalism as a system of commodity exchange.
The extension of Marx’s commodity theory to the present
Marx’s analysis of the different phases of the capital circuit is usually cited as one of the major 
sources of inspiration for modern circuit theory (see Bellofiore, 1989; Bellofiore and 
Realfonzo, 1997 and Bellofiore et al., 2000).7 While not wishing to denigrate the desire to list 
Marx as one of the illustrious forbears of circuit theory, it has to be pointed out that his 
analysis of the capital circuit is only developed in Volume II of Capital and thus cannot be seen 
to be his analytical point of departure. Marx instead begins with a disaggregated category, a 
single unit of analysis, the commodity. One purpose of this distinctive form of methodological 
reductionism is to establish a generalising insight into the capitalist economic system: to 
reduce the system to a single representative unit is to see across the system and identify what 
all its constituent parts have in common, and that is not the credit relation or any other fixed 
counterparty relation so much as the impersonal commodity exchange relation. Only having 
first established this generality of commodity exchange relations does Marx then proceed to 
discuss particular types of counterparty relations, beginning with the production relation in 
Volume I of Capital and subsequently the credit relation in Volume III. Indeed, even in the 
capital circuit analysis developed in Volume II, the capitalist-worker relation underpinning P, 
the productive phase of the circuit, is sandwiched between two money and commodity phases, 
M-C and C’-M’, that are both based on impersonal exchanges.
Marx’s methodological reductionism serves a further fundamental purpose, which is to 
allow one to see how the capitalist system evolves over time. As the distinguishing 
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characteristics of households, firms, and banks do not change substantially over time, it 
follows that any aggregative macroeconomic theory that focuses on these sectors and on their 
interlinking relations, such as circuit theory, runs the risk of missing any new emergent 
phenomena under capitalism. By contrast, Marx’s reductionist commodity principle permits an 
understanding of emergent phenomena because what is unique about the definition of that 
principle is that it is at once more exclusive and more inclusive than is usual.
The exclusivity of the commodity principle is readily apparent in regard to material 
products. Thus, where all goods and services are usually classified as commodities on account 
of their materiality, this is not the case with Marx. Only those that are priced and exchanged 
against socially sanctioned production standards qualify as commodities, whereas those that 
are priced and traded on privately negotiated terms do not so qualify. This exclusivity property 
of the commodity principle explains the essentiality of money in Marx’s commodity theory: in a 
decentralised production and exchange economy it is only through the functions of money that 
production and pricing standards are set and become binding on producers. 
Conversely, the inclusivity of Marx’s commodity principle lies in the fact that the principle 
can encompass entities other than material products. Notable amongst these, to begin with, 
are the capacities for production, the capacity for labour that is sold for a wage, and the 
capital capacity, the ability to combine human and nonhuman inputs together to produce 
outputs for a profit. It is in regard to the inclusivity property that the historically contingent 
element in Marx’s commodity principle can be seen to be as important as its socially 
contingent element: entities may have the potential to become commoditised but it is only 
under specific circumstances that this potential is realised, as was the case with the labour 
power and capital capacities. These capacities have long had the potential to become 
commoditised because their deployment pre-dates the advent of industrial capitalism, but it 
was only with the agrarian and industrial revolutions of the eighteenth century, which enabled 
the formation of mass markets, that the deployment and pricing of these capacities became 
subject to socially sanctioned market standards.
Commodity systems in Marx’s time remained restricted in two senses: in a geographical 
sense, in that such systems only operated in a few regions of the world, and in a categorical 
sense, in that these regional systems were only comprised of the labour power and capital 
capacities and their material outputs. Both of these restrictions have since been lifted. 
Following the collapse of colonialism in the mid-twentieth century and the collapse of 
communism at the end of that century, production for the market and against market 
standards is now the norm in virtually all of the world’s national economies. Globalisation has 
been defined in many ways, but from a Marxian commodity perspective it can be defined as 
the globalised extension of the commodity principle along the axis of geographical space (see 
Figure 5). On the categorical front, the closing decades of the twentieth century also saw the 
further expansion of the commodity principle to encompass not only capacities and their 
material outputs but also equity and debt securities, an expansion that tied in with the rise of 
large institutional investors as the dominant investor type in the securities markets. 
Financialisation represents the growing size of the world’s securities markets relative to the 
world’s product markets, but from a Marxian commodity perspective, this same phenomenon 
can be said to represent the extension of the commodity principle along the axis of time 
inasmuch as its application to the financial claims on the future outputs of capacities means 
nothing other than the annexation of the future as an auxiliary space of economic activity. This 
spatialisation of the future may seem to be an impossibility, given that the future can never be 
known with certainty, but such a position underestimates the transformative power of the 
commodity principle as newly applied to securities. This will be explained below, but what must 
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first be addressed is the question as to why it was only in the closing decades of the twentieth 
century, following the rise of institutional investors, that securities became commoditised in 
the sense that their value storage capacity was henceforth to be determined against socially 
enforced standards. After all, financial securities have just as long a history of serving as 
stores of value for household savers as they have of serving as financing instruments for the 
governments and corporations issuing them. The answer to this question lies in the manifold 
difficulties that have to be overcome in establishing the type of standards required for the 
commoditisation of financial securities.
As securities have no intrinsic value, they can only acquire a tangible value storage 
capacity if the issuing organisations are tied to two distinct sets of behavioural standards: 
governance standards and production standards. Production standards are necessary for the 
obvious reason that without some demonstrable commitment to them on the part of security-
issuing organisations, there can be no reasonable guarantee of the size and stability of the 
income flows against which claims are made. However, while necessary to the 
commoditisation of securities, production standards are not sufficient. Corporations can excel 
in production but decide not to distribute cash to investors for one reason or other. Similarly, 
governments can excel in service provision and generate tax revenues accordingly but still give 
a low priority to the payment of interest on bonds. For these reasons, governance standards 
are an additional precondition for the commoditisation of securities. 
Broadly defined, the governance of an organisation concerns the way in which it conducts 
its affairs so as to meet the different priorities of its various stakeholders. From the standpoint 
of institutional investors, the question of corporate or public sector governance essentially 
comes down to the level of priority given to their interests as shareholders or bondholders: 
high priority means that there is a reasonably good guarantee that cash will be returned to 
them in the required amounts and at the required intervals, whereas a low priority means that 
there is no guarantee that cash will be returned.8 Thus, where compliance with production 
standards determines the ability of security-issuing organisations to return cash, compliance 
with governance standards determines the readiness to return cash. A further crucial point is 
that governance standards serve not only as constraints for controlling the behaviour of 
security-issuing organisations, but also as benchmarks for comparing that behaviour and 
hence for estimating the degree of risk that has to be factored into securities’ prices. In the 
absence of such benchmarks, risk can only be calculated and priced into financial instruments 
on an associative and privately negotiated basis, which then makes it difficult if not impossible 
to trade these instruments away from their initial conditions of issuance. By contrast, it is only 
when the behavioural risks that are priced into securities are calculated against socially 
sanctioned governance benchmarks that securities then effectively become stand-alone 
stores of value that can be continuously traded away from the initial conditions of issuance 
and, as already noted, institutional investors need to engage in continuous trading for portfolio 
rebalancing purposes.
While production and governance standards stand on a par as preconditions for the 
commoditisation of financial securities, there is no corresponding parity as regards the 
processes by which these contrasting standards become established. The emergence of 
production standards is relatively straightforward in that these are perpetually altered and set 
in the course of market competition. The opposite is the case with governance standards 
because there is no straightforward process by which these standards that are key to the 
commoditisation of securities become socially sanctioned. They do not emerge spontaneously 
out of any competitive process, and nor are they enforced through hard law because there is 
no law that explicitly requires corporations or governments to prioritise the interests of 
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investors over the interests of all other groups who have a stake in their operations.9 Indeed, a 
further complication is that security-issuing organisations have strong reasons for objecting to 
being tied to strict behavioural rules and constraints because these can narrow down their 
room for manoeuvre when executing their production or service provision activities. 
In view of all these difficulties, it follows that only that group of investors for whom the 
commoditisation of financial securities is absolutely essential to their investment function will 
have the motive and determination to bring into existence the type of governance 
infrastructure necessary to that commoditisation. That group are institutional investors, not 
household investors. If the prospective yields on securities compare favourably with those on 
other asset types, households can add financial securities to their mix of savings assets. 
However, if the yields on securities compare unfavourably, there is nothing stopping household 
investors from withdrawing their savings from securities altogether because there is nothing in 
their role as households that requires them to hold at all times a significant proportion of their 
assets in the form of financial securities. This is in sharp contrast to institutional asset 
managers, whose large size requires them to hold large volumes of investable assets, but also 
whose role as financial intermediaries requires them to hold the majority proportion of these 
assets in the form of financial securities.10 These are the only assets that can combine a value 
storage property with the properties of liquidity and portability, and they can only achieve this 
combination on the back of a supporting governance infrastructure.
It is here that we come to the spatialisation of the future, for it is at the point in 
capitalism’s history where financial securities begin to circulate alongside material 
commodities as commodities in their own right that the future also becomes a space in its 
own right, a space that is both dependent on physical space inasmuch as this is where 
organisations produce the material outputs to which financial securities lay claim, and at the 
same time distinct from physical space inasmuch as it is a social construction that owes 
nothing to nature. The crux of the matter is the indispensability of the commodity principle to 
the value storage capacity of financial securities. Strip securities of their commodity attributes 
and they reduce to nothing but air. The security-issuing organisations may promise to repay the 
borrowed sums with interest on the expectation that their sales of products or services will 
generate the necessary revenues, while the investors that lend the sums expect those 
promises to be kept. However, in the absence of any comprehensive system of governance 
rules and constraints that help to reinforce any legal obligations, the promises to return cash 
remain just that: promises. Only when there is a comprehensive system of governance rules 
and constraints in place do securities acquire a certain solidity as determinate quantities of 
value. It is this solidity that allows us to say that the future has become spatialised, because in 
acquiring a secured quantitative value storage capacity that they cannot otherwise have in the 
absence of a supporting governance infrastructure, equities and bonds in effect become the 
individual building blocks from which the future is constructed as a habitable space. Devoid of 
matter when only existing subjectively in the minds of agents forming expectations about 
future possibilities and outcomes, the future now becomes a space filled with matter through 
the objectification of expectations about the future in the form of commodities. Uncertainty 
and risk are by no means eliminated because they can never be eliminated, but what a dense 
infrastructure of governance rules and constraints does do is to allow uncertainty and risk to 
be sufficiently managed and controlled so as to make the future fit for permanent occupation.
Where it is the portfolio needs of institutional investors that lead to a system of standards 
and constraints that constitute the infrastructure of the future as an economic space, it is the 
financing needs of governments, banks, and non-bank corporations that determine the mass 
of securities that fill that space. Given that the various behavioural rules and constraints that 
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security-issuing organisations must comply with are now far tighter than anything seen in the 
past and, as noted, restrict the degree of discretion that the latter can exercise in the course of 
their activities, there has to be a good reason why they are prepared to accept these rules and 
constraints. That reason, stripped down to essentials, is that borrowing costs can be contained 
even while borrowing volumes are systematically increased. The point is that the borrowing 
organisations not only do not have to compensate investors for loss of liquidity, but also that 
they are not constrained by the time scale of repayments to the same extent that they are 
when resorting to other forms of borrowing. Equities are undated, while bonds have finite 
maturities, but the maturity range of bonds is now wider than ever with 30-year, 50-year and 
even 100-year bonds now being acceptable to institutional investors. Thus, while substantial 
sums can be raised immediately at the point of sale of the securities, the repayments of these 
funds can be spread over long spans of time, with some being made in the near future and the 
rest at intermittent points into the distant future. In short, the upside to the acceptance of the 
restrictive conditions necessary to the commoditisation of financial securities is that the 
issuing organisations can thereby use the future as a repository in which to store their 
liabilities until redemption, just as, on the other side of the equation, institutional investors 
need to hold those liabilities so as to meet their own liabilities as and when they fall due.
In this way, financialisation viewed through a Marxian commodity lens is a process that is 
at once compatible with the logic of capitalism as a commodity exchange system and 
functionally necessary to this system’s development in the contemporary era. It is logically 
compatible because the continuing growth of the securities markets relative to the underlying 
production base, which is the hallmark of financialisation, is entirely contingent on the 
application of the commodity principle to equities and bonds. It is functionally necessary 
because the spatialisation of the future made possible by the commoditisation of securities 
allows major public and private organisations to offload much of their growing financial 
burdens into this space. To what extent the global financial securities markets will continue to 
grow in scale is a question to which we do not know the answer. As securities are nothing other 
than claims on future material outputs, there has to be a limit to global financial market scale. 
However, we do not know what this limit is because history offers no lessons in this regard. 
What is certain is that, having just begun in recent decades and being mainly confined thus far 
to relatively few advanced market economies, financialisation will not only persist for some 
time to come but will also continue to develop as its extends its hold over many of the world’s 
other market economies. It will do so because as these economies continue to grow and 
mature, and the financial pressures on their major organisations grow accordingly, so too will 
these organisations be forced to colonise the future so as to make it take the overspill of those 
financial pressures they face in the present.
Conclusion
This article has briefly presented two contrasting approaches to the contemporary 
financialisation process, the circuitist approach and a Marxian commodity approach. Originally 
developed in the 1980’s, circuit theory may continue to provide useful insights into a number 
of economic areas. However, the area of financialisation is not one of them. Circuit theory’s 
highly aggregative macroeconomic approach, and its concentrated focus on the financing 
needs of corporations in particular, prevent it from being able to accommodate the continuing 
growth in scale of the global financial markets other than by dismissing a substantial part of 
that growth as dysfunctional. As argued at the outset, an explanation of the functionality of 
financial scale requires an analytical apparatus whose scope is sufficiently elastic as to 
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include broader socio-economic factors, notably those associated with demographic change, 
as co-drivers of financialisation. This article has sought to show that Marx’s commodity 
principle fits this requirement.
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Notes
1.    Italian circuit theory is most closely associated with Graziani (1988; 2003). See Realfonzo (2006) 
for a review. Parguez (1996; 2001) is an important figure in French circuit theory, but for a review 
of both earlier and later contributors to this branch, see Gnos (2011).
2.    Given that financialisation represents one of the most important developments in the monetary 
sphere of capitalism over the past two decades, it is curious that so few of the leading circuit 
theorists have addressed this phenomenon. Graziani makes only small reference to it in his Theory 
of Monetary Production (2003), but he could be forgiven for this in light of the fact that 
financialisation was only then just beginning to merit serious attention from heterodox economists. 
There have been some heterodox economists since looking at financialisation from a circuitist 
standpoint, such as Sawyer (2013) and Passarella (2014), more on whom below, but of those who 
have been closely associated with the development and propagation of circuit theory, only 
Seccareccia (2013) has been prepared to confront financialisation head-on from a circuitist 
perspective.
3.    Sawyer’s bracketing together of all non-bank financial institutions under the label ‘shadow banks’ 
is clumsy on two counts. The first is that the whole point of applying the term ‘shadow’ to off-
balance sheet entities such as special purpose entities (SPEs), structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs), and conduits is that these entities fall outside the scope of financial regulation. By contrast, 
pension funds and other institutional asset managers are subject to prudential regulation. The 
second count is that one of the primary functions of the shadow banks is the securitisation of 
bank loans, with SPEs and SIVs specialising in the creation of long-term securities such as asset 
backed securities (ABSs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), and the conduits specialising 
in the creation of short-term securities and asset backed commercial paper (ABCP). By contrast, 
pension funds and other institutional asset managers do not engage in securitisation. For further 
discussion, see Lysandrou and Nesvetailova (2015) and Lysandrou and Shabani (2018).
4.    Old-age dependency ratio, in OECD (2017). A further striking statistic concerns the number of 
individuals aged over 80 as a percentage share of the population. In 1950 less than 1% of the 
global population was aged over 80, whereas by 2050 that share is expected to quadruple to 4%. 
The more important increase, however, is expected for the OECD countries, where by 2050 some 
10% of their population will be over 80 (see Colombo et al., 2011). 
5.    General Government Spending, OECD Data (Annual Series); OECD (2019a). 
6.    Although institutional asset management is now undergoing most rapid growth in the EMEs of 
Latin America and South East Asia, the bulk of assets under management (over 80%) continue to 
be concentrated in the AMEs of North America and West Europe (Haldane, 2014; EFAMA, 2017). 
7.    This section draws on ideas first published in Lysandrou (2016) and Lysandrou (2019). 
8.    According to the World Economic Forum (2019), the individual governance institutions that 
comprise a country’s governance infrastructure (the first ‘pillar’ of a country’s economic 
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competiveness) broadly divide into two categories: the public institutions that include efficiency of 
legal framework, judiciary independence and reliability of police, and the private institutions that 
include investor protection, protection of minority shareholder interests, auditing and reporting 
standards, and efficacy of corporate boards.  It is well established that public institutions are a key 
determinant of a country’s business sector success: the higher their quality, the lower are the 
various risks of doing business. The point to be emphasised here is that for pension funds and 
other institutional asset managers, who need to hold diversified portfolios and are thus necessarily 
minority shareholders or bondholders in firms, it is the quality of the private institutions in addition 
to that of the public institutions that is essential to limiting the risks on their investments.
9.    To quote Simon Deakin (2018: 26): “shareholder primacy … is not so much the result of the core 
content of company law, but rather the cumulative impact of changes in complementary regulation 
of corporate governance in recent decades. The relevant changes are mostly to be found in ‘soft 
law’ codes and standards, made by financial actors themselves, principally institutional 
shareholders, to which governments have ceded rule-making authority”.
10.  Thus, according to a recent OECD report on pension funds: “In most countries, bonds and equities 
are the two main asset classes in which pension assets were invested at the end of 2018, 
accounting for more than half of all investments in 32 out of 36 OECD countries, and 39 out of 46 
other reporting jurisdictions” (OECD, 2019b: 29).   
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